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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Potlatch School District No .. 285 and Board of Trustees, Potlatch School 
District No, 285 (hereinafter collectively referred to as "School District", pursuant 
to I.A.R. 35(d)) agree with the general ideas put forth in the Opening Brief by 
Potlatch Education Association and Doug Richard (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as "PEA", pursuant to I.A.R. 35(d)), though they would state them differently. 
The nature of this case is a contract dispute between School District and PEA 
regarding whether the School District Master Agreement gives the School District 
discretion to determine whether to allow an employee to take a professional leave 
day. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
The School District does not disagree with the PEA's statement regarding 
the Course of Proceedings Below, see Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 1 - 3, and 
does not add anything to the PEA's statement. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
The School District disagrees with certain material facts as stated by the 
PEA, as stated below. Other material facts also necessary for consideration are 
presented below. 
1 . The PEA argues that "[t]he PEA and the School District eventually 
agreed to the School District's Professional Leave proposal." Appellants' Opening 
Brief, p. 4. The School District disputes this contention. The Affidavit of Brian 
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Potter contains a "side-by-side comparison of the School Board's and the PEA's 
respective proposals concerning Professional Leave (with the School Board's 
proposals in the left column and the PEA's proposals in the right column)." See R. 
Vol. I, pp.'82, 86 - 87. This side-by-side comparison reads as follows: 
10.5 Professional Leave. Attendance 
at educational · meetings or visiting 
other schools is permitted at full pay if 
such absence is approved by the 
Superintendent. If any teacher wishes 
to be absent from duty for a brief 
period to attend a professional meeting 
or workshop, to visit schools, or 
otherwise pursue professional 
development, a written request for 
approval of such absence should be 
signed by the principal and filed in the 
superintendent's office at least ten ( 1 0) 
working days prior to the first day of 
anticipated absence. Professional leave 
is not to exceed two (2) days per year 
and is noncumulative. 
5.6 Professional Leave Attendance at 
educational meetings or visiting other 
schools is permitted at full pay if such 
absence is approved by the principal. If 
any supervisor, principal, teacher, or 
other employee wishes to be absent 
from duty for a brief period to attend a 
professional meeting, to visit schools, 
or for any personal reason which is not 
an unavoidable emergency, a written 
request for approval of such absence 
should be signed by the principal and 
filed in the superintendent's office at 
least two (2) days prior to the first day 
of anticipated absence. 
R. Vol. I, p. 87. The Professional Leave provision incorporated into the Master 
Agreement reads: 
10.5 Professional Leave Attendance at educational meetings or 
visiting other schools is permitted at full pay if such absence is 
approved by the Principal. If any certificated personnel wishes to be 
absent from duty for a brief period to attend a professional meeting, to 
visit schools, or otherwise pursue professional development, a written 
request for approval of such absence should be signed by the Principal 
and filed in the Superintendent's office at least two (2) days prior to 
the first day of anticipated absence. Professional leave is not to 
exceed two (2) days per year and is non-cumulative. The Principal may 
make exceptions on the number of days allowed when necessary. 
R. Vol. II, pp. 185 - 86. When compared with the versions proposed by the School 
District and by the PEA, the final version is an amalgamation of verbiage proposed 
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by both entities, as well as. some new language. Thus it is unfair for the PEA to 
argue that both sides "eventually agreed to the School District's" proposed 
language for the Professional Leave provision. 
2. The PEA argues that "The School District's sole reason for denying 
Richards professional leave· and/or refusing to reclassify the personal leave to 
professional leave was based on its belief that Richards' defense of his Master's 
final project did not constitute professional leave· under the terms of the Master 
Agreement." Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 6. This is not an entirely accurate 
statement. More accurately, that was the only stated reason why the School 
District denied Mr. Richards professional leave. See R. Vol. I, pp. 108, 110. The 
School District also argued that Mr. Richards was not entitled to additional 
professional leave because he had already used up more than two professional 
leave days for the year. R. Vol. I, pp. 137 - 39. However, the District Court later 
ruled that the School District had waived this argument, as the School District had 
not given it as a reason to deny professional leave during any of the grievance 
process. Tr. Vol. I, p. 32, II. 4 - 13. Regardless, it is incorrect for the PEA to state 
the "sole reason" Mr. Richards was denied professional leave was any one 
particular reason. 
3. Along the same lines as above, the PEA states that Mr. Richards 
"requested a total of two (2) professional leave days for absences that he believed 
qualified for professional leave purposes, one of which was to defend his Master's 
final project." Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 6. While this alleged fact is not 
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necessarily relevant to the decision of this case', it is nonetheless a factual issue. 
In its Response to the PEA's Motion for Summary Judgment, the School District 
has pointed to numerous other times during the school year in question in which 
Mr. Richards was granted professional leave, both before anp after the incident in 
question. See R. Vol. II, pp. 217, 219 - 20, 222, and 229. The School District 
accepts that this is a disputed issue of fact. 2 
4. Mr: Richards was hired as a music teacher, and his teaching contract 
specifically indicates that he was assigned as an "Elementary/Secondary Music 
Teacher." R. Vol. I, p. 71. 
5. The School District does not argue that Mr. Richards was defending 
his master's degree on or about May 3, 2007. Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 5 -
6. However, the type of master's degree is important. It is relevant to note that Mr. 
Richards' master's degree was not a general "Master's Degree in Education" as 
contended by the PEA, Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5, but was more specifically a 
master's degree in education administration. R. Vol. I, p. 110. 
6. Certificated teachers typically have 190-day contracts. Tr. Vol. I, p. 
27, II. 24 - 25; R. Vol. II, p. 197. The Master Agreement contains provision for a 
minimum of 24 days of various types of leave that must be given to certificated 
personnel if requested. R. Vol. I, p. 133. This includes 11 days of mandatory sick 
The School District makes this argument on the basis that Judge Stegner ruled that the 
School District had essentially waived its right to bring this argument. 
2 Judge Stegner did not address this issue as he considered the School District's arguments 
related to it as waived. 
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leave, R. Vol. II, p. 183, three (3) days of mandatory family leave, R. Vol. II, p. 
185, three (3) days of mandatory funeral leave, R. Vol. II, p. 185, four (4) days of 
personal leave, R. Vol. II, p. 185, and three (3) days of association leave, R. Vol. II, 
pp. 187 ...: 88. This calculation of 24 mandatory leave days does not include the 
unlimited number of paid leave days to serve on jury duty. R. Vol. II, p. 187. Each 
of these types of leave is non-discretionary, stating that the School District "shall" 
grant such leave if requested. See R. Vol. II, pp. 183, 185, 187 - 88 (Master 
Agreement § § 10.1, 10.3, 10.4, and 10. 7). The only type of leave discussed in 
the Master Agreement which does not contain language mandating that the School 
District provide such leave if requested is professional leave. R. Vol. I, pp. 185 -
86. 
7. The PEA left out an essential fact which will aid this Court in 
understanding the District Court's ruling. District Judge John R. Stegner, from 
whose ruling this appeal is taken, was integrally involved in the negotiation process 
regarding the Master Agreement between the School District and the PEA. Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 6, II. 2 - 20; p. 13, II. 11 - 15. Judge Stegner stated "Well, having spent four 
days in trying to help the District and the Education Association hammer out the 
agreement, I don't think I've ever seen an as arms-length agreement as that which 
I tried to help hammer out." Tr. Vol. I, p. 13, II. 11 - 15. Judge Stegner was 
intimately familiar with the Master Agreement, the background negotiations, and 
the intent of the parties. Therefore, he was in a uniquely qualified position to make 
the ruling that he made. 
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II. RESTATED AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The School District believes that the issues on appeal may be simply stated 
as follows: 
(a) · Did the Schoo.I District, through its principals and administrators, have 
discretion in determining whether to grant Mr. Richards' request for 
professional lea've? 
(b) If so, did the School District act within the bounds of its discretion? 
Ill. ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL 
The School District requests that they be awarded attorney fees on appeal 
pursuant to J.C. § § 12-121 and 12-117. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review for an Appeal from a Grant of Summary Judgment. 
"On an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's 
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court in ruling 
on a motion for summary judgment." Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'/ Ass'n, 141 Idaho 
362, 366 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a. 
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
"When questions of law are presented, this Court exercises free review and 
is not bound by findings of the district court, but is free to draw its own 
conclusions from the evidence presented." Mut. of Enumclaw v. Box, 1 27 Idaho 
851, 852 (1995). "The interpretation of a contract's meaning and legal effect are 
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questions of law to be decided by the Court if the terms of the contract are clear 
and unambiguous." State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231, 234 ( 1999). "The fact that 
both parties move for summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact. The fact that the parties have filed cross-
motions for summary judgm·ent does not change the applicable standard of review, 
and this Court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits." Shawver v. 
Huckleberry Estates, LL. C., 140 Idaho 354, 360 (2004) (citing Kromrei v. AID Ins. 
Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551 (1986), and Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 207 
(2000)). 
B. The Language of the Professional Leave Clause Gives the School District 
Discretion to Determine What Constitutes Professional Development, and the 
School District Acted Reasonably in Denying Mr. Richards Professional 
Leave. 
The PEA contends that Judge Stegner erred on numerous grounds in not 
granting summary judgment to the PEA. However, Judge Stegner's determination 
that the School District was entitled to Summary Judgment was based on a very 
simple legal construct: the Professional Leave provision gives the School District 
discretion to determine whether to grant professional leave, and the School District 
did not act unreasonably in denying Mr. Richards' request for professional leave. In 
Judge Stegner's own words: 
... I think by the use of the word "if," the parties agree that some 
discretion would be afforded the District. Then, I think it's incumbent 
upon me to try to identify the parameters of that discretion. 
Mr. Julian referred to arbitrary and capricious. I think that's 
clearly something that is a direction they cannot go. I think general 
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contract provisions would require good faith .and fair dealing within the 
parameters of the interpretations of this agreement. 
So, the District has discretion. The parameters are arbitrary and 
capricious and good faith and fair dealing. And then the question is 
does a master's in administration for a teacher of music fall within 
professional development. 
While I thought before when I read the agreement, I thought 
that the Education Assocation and Mr. Richards would win. I think 
that after having had a chance to review the information and have the 
facts laid out before me, while your initial point may be that it was, 
Mr. Rumel, that it may be short-sighted on the part of the District, I 
don't think they have violated the contract. So, I am granting 
summary judgment on behalf of the District as far as this particular 
issue is concerned. 
Well, were this a master's in pedagogy, music pedagogy, music 
performance, anything that I would consider to be within the ambit of 
Mr. Richards' responsibilities, I don't think there would be any doubt 
that that would - that this decision would be different than it is today. 
Were there some suggestion that the District were cultivating Mr. 
Richards for an administrative position, or if somebody had said to him 
we'd like you to pursue administration because we need 
administrators, I think the facts would be different .... 
. . . I think the District has an obligation to identify some 
problem in providing it, i.e, [sic] it came too quickly, or there aren't 
any subs that are available to provide leave on this particular occasion, 
those I think would be legitimate bases for the District to deny the 
request. Beyond that, I don't know what else would. 
And I think there has to be - I think arbitrary and capricious are 
- it cannot be arbitrary and capricious. It can't be a violation of good 
faith and fair dealing. And as I - I mean, I think you hit the nail on the 
head at the outset. It may be short-sighted, but whether that's within 
the discretion is another question. 
Tr. Vol./, p. 32, I. 13 - p. 33, I. 13; p. 34, II. 2 - 12; p. 34, I. 23 - p. 35, I. 10. 
Judge Stegner makes it clear that he believes that the School District has discretion 
in determining whether to grant professional leave. This is in accord with the 
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language of the Master Agreement, which states "Attendance at educational 
meetings or visiting other schools is permitted at full pay .if such absence is 
approved by the Principal." R. Vol. II, p. 185 (Master Agreement § 10.5). There is 
nothing in 'the Master Agreement which would contradict the. plain language of this 
statement, which is that professional leave is available only if it is approved by the 
Principal. Further, this language is different from every other type of leave 
discussed in the Master Agreement, all of which state that the leave "shall" be 
granted. See § I.C.6., supra. Thus, Judge Stegner properly recognized that there 
was discretion. 
The next issue he discussed was whether the School District acted within 
the bounds of that discretion. Judge Stegner determined that there were some 
limits on that discretion, and that it was not unlimited. Tr. Vol. /, p. 32, I. 24 - p. 
33, I. 3. The Idaho Courts have recognized that, in some circumstances, a contract 
provision which gives a party seemingly unlimited discretion to accept or deny a 
particular act by another party may be inherently limited. In Funk v. Funk, 102 
Idaho 521 (1981), a lessee sought the consent of the lessor to sublease farm land. 
Funk v. Funk, 102 Idaho 521,522 (1981). The lease stated that the lessee could 
sublease the property if they obtained consent of the lessor. Funk, 102 Idaho at 
522. The lessor declined to give consent unless the lease terms were substantially 
rewritten. Funk, 102 Idaho at 522. This Court held that under the circumstances, 
though the language of the contract did not specifically state, "the consent of a 
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lessor may not be unreasonably withheld." Funk, 102 Idaho at 524 (emphasis 
added). 
A similar result was reached in Cheney v. Jemmett, 107 Idaho 829 (1984), 
another case which involved a property contract dispute. In that case, the contract 
stated that "[the] Purchasers agree that they will not assign this agreement, nor 
any interest herein or in the property hereby agreed to be sold and purchased, 
without first obtaining the written consent of Sellers." Cheney, 107 Idaho at 830. 
Regarding this clause, this Court stated "In our view, the interpretation of a non-
assignment clause conditioned on the consent of the seller as in the present case, 
necessarily implies that the seller will act reasonably and in good faith in exercising 
his right of approval." Cheney, 107 Idaho at 832. The Court further cited to other 
cases holding similarly: 
The Utah Supreme Court cogently expressed our views in this regard. 
"Where a contract provides that the matter of approval of 
performance is reserved to a party, he must 'act fairly and in good 
faith in exercising that right. He has no right to withhold arbitrarily his 
approval; there must be a reasonable justification for doing so."' 
Prince v. Elm Investment Co., 649 P.2d 820, 825 (Utah 1982); 
(quoting William G. Vandever & Co. v. Black, 645 P.2d 637, 639 
(Utah 1982)); see also W.P. Harlin Construction Co. v. Utah State 
Road Commission, 19 Utah 2d 364, 431 P.2d 792 (1967). 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Montana has stated that "[when] a 
matter in a contract is left to the determination of one party alone, 
that party's determination is conclusive if he acts in good faith." 
Brown v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association, 154 Mont. 79, 
460 P.2d 97, 100 (1969) (emphasis added); cf. Meredith Corp. v. 
Design & Lithography Center, Inc., 101 Idaho 391, 614 P.2d 414 
( 1980) (satisfaction requirement determined by reasonable person 
standard). 
Cheney, 107 Idaho at 832 - 33 (emphasis in the original). 
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Both Funk and Cheney involve property contract disputes surrounding the 
right of assignment. It is not · clear whether this Court intended this · line of 
precedent to extended to non,assignment contract issues. The language cited in 
Cheney, though, is broad enough to include all contractual. issues, and not just 
those involving rights of assignment.3 Thus, the issue is twofold: first, if Judge 
Stegner was incorrect, and there is no requirement that the School District act in 
good faith or be reasonable in exercising discretion, then Judge Stegner' s ruling 
was still proper. He recognized that the School District exercised its discretion, 
which the Master Agreement clearly allows the School District power to do. 
Therefore, the School District cannot be wrong, regardless of what decision it 
made, so long as it exercised discretion. 
Second, if this Court determines that the School District is bound by a 
standard of "reasonableness" in the exercise of its discretion, then the issue was 
still appropriately decided by Judge Stegner. The facts show that Mr. Richards' 
teaching contract shows that his assignment was as an "Elementary/Secondary 
Music Teacher". R. Vol. I, p. 71. In contrast, Mr. Richards' Masters' Degree was in 
Educational Administration. R. Vol. I, p. 110.4 The PEA makes a great deal of 
3 It should be noted that Prince v. Elm Inv. Co., 649 P.2d 820 (Utah 1982) also involves a 
property issue, but not the right of assignment. The issue in Prince is under what circumstances a 
party can reject a right of first refusal. Prince, 649 p.2d at 821. Brown v. First Fed. Sav. & loan 
Ass'n, 460 P.2d 97 (Mont. 1969) (overruled on other grounds, Estate of Strever v. Cline, 278 
Mont. 165, 178 (Mont, 1996)) also involves property issues, but the contract in question was a 
mortgage loan. Brown, 460 P.2d at 98. 
4 As an aside, the School District finds delicious irony in this fact. Mr. Richards is presumably 
getting his Masters Degree in Educational Administration to become a principal or superintendent. 
Under the PEA's theory of this case, the teacher has the discretion to determine whether a 
professional leave day must be granted. If Mr. Richards were to become an administrator, by this 
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arguing that a Master's . Degree in Education is professional development. 
Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 12 - 14. The .PEA supports this by pointing to 
various dictionary definitions .and .other portions of the Master Agreement. In 
looking at' the Master Agreement, the PEA points out that the master's degree 
would have an affect on Mr. Richards' salary, and therefore constitutes 
professional development. Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 13. However, neither the 
salary schedule nor the salary requirements refer to the Professional Leave 
provision. They also do not specify what sort of credits will affect salary, but only 
state when such credits will be counted. R. Vol. I, 106. Thus, once the temporal 
hurdle is overcome, any credits toward any degree will count for salary 
advancement. Further, the rule cited by the PEA is "words used in one sense in one 
part of the contract are deemed to have been used in the same sense in another 
part of the same instrument." Bair v. Barron, 97 Idaho 26, 30 (1975). In this case, 
the PEA is trying to compare "professional development" in the professional leave 
clause with "professional growth" in the salary provisions. Appellants' Opening 
Brief, p. 13. There is no indication that these two phrases were intended to be 
construed together, as they are not the same wording. 
With regard to the dictionary definitions cited by the PEA, the School District 
cannot argue that the definitions do not say what they say. But by the same token 
it is not clear that the definitions are in any way helpful. The PEA's definition of 
lawsuit he would effectively have removed from himself the discretion clearly granted to School 
District administration by the terms of the Professional Leave provisions. At a minimum, this goes to 
show that it was not unreasonable for the School District to determine that a Masters' Degree in 
educational administration does not qualify as professional development. 
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"professional" ("an occupation or vocation requiring training in the liberal arts or 
the sciences and advanced study in a specialized field," Appel/ants' Opening Brief, 
p. 13) is very broad. Under this definition, a teacher is a professional. So are an 
astronomer, a doctor, a priest, a lawyer, an orchestra conductor, an architect, and 
a cabinet maker. If Mr. Richards chose to develop ("to aid in the growth of," 
Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 13) as an astronomer, doctor, priest, lawyer, etc., 
does that mean under the PEA's interpretation, he must be given time off to 
develop his profession? Certainly this is not required or contemplated by the 
Professional Leave provisions. So where is the boundary of what defines 
professional development (as that term is undefined)? The language of the 
Professional Leave agreement itself gives some idea of the limits of what 
constitutes professional development: "Attendance at educational meetings or 
visiting other schools ... to attend a professional meeting, to visit schools ... " R. 
Vol. II, p. 185. This language appears to indicate that the boundaries of 
professional development are related to the position the employee already has. 
While the definitional boundaries surrounding the term "professional 
development" are vague, what keeps this provision from becoming fatally vague is 
that the ultimate decision is given to the Principal to determine whether 
professional leave will be granted. This person must therefore implicitly also have 
the authority to determine what constitutes professional development. 
In this case, Mr. Richards received a note informing him that the Principal did 
not consider defending a Masters' Degree in educational administration professional 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 13 
development, as it was not. related to Mr. Richards' duties as a music teacher. R. 
Vol. I, p. 73. After filing a grievance, the School Di$trict further notified Mr. 
Richards that getting his master's degree did not qualify as professional 
development. R. Vol. I, pp. 108 .and 110. These are not unr~aso.nable conclusions. 
As Judge Stegner notes, ,;[w]ere there some suggestion that the District were 
cultivating Mr. Richards for an administrative position, or if somebody had said to 
him we'd like you to pursue administration because we need administrators, I think 
the facts would be different." Tr. Vol. I, p. 34, II. 7 - 12. While a master's degree 
might affect Mr. Richards' salary, the School District clearly recognized that a 
master's degree in education administration was not designed to help Mr. Richards 
continue as a music teacher. A music teacher would not get a masters in education 
administration to continue working as a music teacher; the goal can only be to 
become a principal or superintendent. While a school district administrator .and a 
music teacher may be professions within the same general are.a, they are not the 
same profession. Therefore, it was reasonable for the School District to determine 
that Mr. Richards use of time constituted personal time. It is no different than a 
lawyer attempting to become a judge; both professions are in the same field, but 
being a judge has very little to do with the lawyer's current case load. Making the 
switch (and going through the training for such switch) is a personal effort. 
The Professional Leave provision gives the School District discretion in 
determining whether to grant professional leave, and inherently to decide what 
constitutes professional development. The School District exercised that discretion, 
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and certainly Within the bounds of reason. Therefore, there is no cause for this 
Court to determine that the School District has breached Mr. Richards' contract, or 
the contract with the PEA. 
C. The' Rule of Contra Preferentem is not Appropriate in this .case Because the 
Language of the Professional Leave Clause was Negotiated by Both Parties 
to the Master Agreement. 
The PEA makes a contract interpretation argument, which under the 
circumstances of this case, is not merited. The PEA relies on the rule of contra 
proferentem5 , which holds that "that a contract should be construed most strongly 
against the party preparing it or employing the words concerning which doubt 
arises." J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 616 (2006). There are 
numerous Idaho cases which rely on this rule. See Big Butte Ranch v. Grasmick, 91 
Idaho 6, 9 (1966); Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 136 (1975); 
Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 519 (1948). However, in 
each of these cases, the Supreme Court notes in essential factor that is uniformly 
present: one party unilaterally provided the language at issue, without the input of 
the other party. See J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 615 - 1 6 (2006) 
("Bosen filled out and signed the Commercial Sales Agreement ... Bosen signed as 
the Applicant without designating that he was signing in a representative capacity . 
. . The court also stated that any ambiguity created by the manner in which Bosen 
filled out and signed the Commercial Sales Agreement should be construed against 
"Against the party who proffers or puts forward a thing." Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 
Fourth Ed., "contra proferentem". 
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him."); Big Butte Ranch v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, .9 (1966) ("The evidence left no 
doubt that appellant, Big Butte Ranch, through its attorney Ranquist, selected the 
language in its material parts. Ranquist, acting for aplant [sic], actually drafted the 
contract at his office in Salt Lake City and forwarded .it to respondent for 
approval."); Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 136 (1975) ("[T]he 
entire contract was written by appellant; the basic agreement was a form provided 
by Phillips and the subsequent letters were written by a Phillips employee. Phillips 
was the party selecting the language which was used."); Morgan v. Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 519 (1948) ("The contract was on one of 
respondent's printed forms, prepared by it and containing its language."). 
The rule of contra proferentem is not applicable to every contract. The 
Restatement Second of Contracts provides some insight. The Restatement rules 
state "In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a 
term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party 
who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds." Restat. 2d 
of Contracts, § 206. This language is in conformity with the Idaho cases cited 
above. However, the comments give the rationale for the rule, which indicates that 
it isn't always applicable: 
a. Rationale. . .. The rule is often invoked in cases of standardized 
contracts and in cases where the drafting party has the stronger 
bargaining position, but it is not limited to such cases. It is in 
strictness a rule of legal effect, sometimes called construction, as well 
as interpretation: its operation depends on the positions of the parties 
as they appear in litigation, and sometimes the result is hard to 
distinguish from a denial of effect to an unconscionable clause. 
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Restat. 2d of Contracts, § 206 (comment a). This rationale indicates that the point 
of this rule is to, as it were, even the playing field between. parties of different 
bargaining strength. As one Court stated, 
Since the party of superior bargaining power not only prescribes the 
words of the instrument but the party who subscribes to it lacks the 
economic strength to change that language, any ambiguity in the 
contract is resolved against the draftsman and questions of doubtful 
interpretation will be construed in favor of the subscribing party. 
Spence v. Omnibus Industries, 44 Cal. App. 3d 970, 974 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 
1975). 
Logic would dictate that where the parties are of equal bargaining strength, 
then this rule of construction is unnecessary. There are numerous cases which hold 
to this proposition. In Joyner v. Adams, 87 N.C. App. 570 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), 
the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for certain findings of fact. 
Joyner v. Adams, 87 N.C. App. 570, 576 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987). On remand the 
appellate court gave this advice: 
In remanding, we necessarily find that the trial court erred in awarding 
judgment for plaintiff based on the rule that ambiguity in contract 
terms must be construed most strongly against the party which 
drafted the contract. The rule is essentially one of legal effect, of 
"construction" rather than "interpretation," since it can scarcely be 
said to be designed to ascertain the meanings attached by the parties. 
The rule's application rests on a public policy theory that the party 
who chose the word is more likely to have provided more carefully for 
the protection of his own interests, is more likely to have had reason 
to know of uncertainties, and may have even left the meaning 
deliberately obscure. Consequently, the rule is usually applied in cases 
involving an adhesion contract or where one party is in a stronger 
bargaining position, although it is not necessarily limited to those 
situations. In this case, where the parties were at arm's length and 
were equally sophisticated, we believe the rule was improvidently 
invoked. 
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Before this rule of construction should be applied, the record should 
affirmatively show that "the form of expression in words was actually 
chosen by one [party] rather than by the other." The only evidence 
admitted regarding who drafted the 1975 amendment is Mr. Joyner's 
testimony that no one in his law firm had anything to do with it. Even 
assuming this is sufficient to support an inference that defendant or 
his agent wrote the provision, it does not establish that defendant can 
be charged with havirig chosen its language. 
The record reveals that both parties are experienced in the real estate 
business and that they bargained from essentially equal positions of 
power. The record also shows the parties engaged in a fairly 
protracted negotiation process, with the provision in question 
undergoing particular scrutiny. Nothing in the record shows that it was 
defendant, rather than plaintiff, who "drafted" the provision. Instead, 
it appears that the language was assented to by parties who had both 
the knowledge to understand its import and the bargaining power to 
alter it. Therefore, the policy behind the rule is not served in its 
application here and the trial court erred in using the rule to award 
judgment for plaintiff. 
Joyner v. Adams, 87 N.C. App. 570, 576 - 77 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (internal 
citations omitted). The appellate court clearly held that the rule put forward by the 
PEA is not applicable where both parties contributed to the language of the 
contract. 
Other courts have held similarly. In an Idaho Federal District Court case, the 
judge found as follows: 
At the time of the May 9, 2006 ruling on Plaintiff's first Motion for 
Summary Judgment, there was evidence and information in the record 
explaining that the Contract was "prepared by [Defendants'] attorney 
and counsel for [Plaintiff]," that is, it was "negotiated between the 
two attorneys," involved "many drafts," and "took a long time." In 
addition, Defendants had noted in their summary judgment response 
papers that "[a]lthough the Earnest Money Contract was initially 
prepared by counsel for the Greensboro Defendants, the parties 
exchanged at least nine (9) separate drafts of the [Contract] prior to 
its execution." Thus, the Court did not apply the principle that 
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ambiguities should be construed against the party who drafted the 
instrument because the record demonstrated that both parties and 
their counsel actively participated in negotiations leading to drafting of 
the final version of the Contract. 
Even if Greensboro had chosen the language in Section 9.4(e) without 
any'input or negotiation with Plaintiff's counsel, the rule Plaintiff relies 
on (known as the rule of contra proferentum · [sic]) is usually applied in 
cases involving an adhesion contract or where one party is in a 
stronger bargaining position, although it is not necessarily limited to 
those situations. 
DBS/ Signature Place, LLC v. Bl Greensboro, l.P., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86367, 
*9 - *10 (D. Idaho Nov. 28, 2006) (internal citations omitted). 6 
Other cases have held similarly. "[W]hen the parties to the insurance 
agreement are sophisticated and jointly negotiate the policy, there is no need to 
construe ambiguities against the insurance company. The intent of construction 
against the insurer arises from concern over the lack of bargaining power between 
the insurance company and the insured." Fountain Powerboat Indus. v. Reliance 
Ins. Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 552, 555 (E.D.N.C. 2000). Another case has stated 
"[w]hile it may be true as a general rule that ambiguities are construed against the 
drafter, there are a number of reasons why that principle should not apply," 
including when the contracting parties are sophisticated, commercial entities who 
negotiated on equal footing and the language at issue was accepted without 
negotiation or comment. In re HWC liquidating Co., 1999 WL 33631231, * 5 
6 The Court in DBS/ Signature Place, LLC, later determined that summary judgment was not 
appropriate in this case, as there was an issue of fact as to whether both parties contributed to a 
particular provision, or whether one party created it unilaterally, DBS/ Signature Place, LLC, 2006 
U.S. Dist, Lexis 86367 at *14. In this case, the facts show that the Professional Leave clause was 
clearly negotiated by both parties. 
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(W.D.N.C. 1999) (cited in. DBS/ Signature Place, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
86367 at *14). 
While there does not appear to be an Idaho state court case holding that the 
rule of contra proferentem .does not apply in every contract case, there is similarly 
no Idaho case holding that it must be applied. Each of the Idaho cases cited above 
shows that one party unilaterally provided the language at issue. In this case, the 
facts show that this was not what occurred. As noted above, both the School 
District and the PEA provided proposed language for the Professional Leave clause. 
See R. Vol. I, p. 87. The enacted language of the Profes.sional Leave clause is 
neither solely the language proposed by the PEA or solely the language proposed 
by the School District, but is an amalgam of the two, and in fact, contains 
language that was not originally proposed by either party. As Judge Stegner said, 
"I don't think I've ever seen an as arms-length agreement as that which I tried to 
help hammer out." Tr. Vol. I, p. 13, II. 13 - 15. Under these circumstances, it is 
not necessary to apply the rule of contra preferentem. 
It should be noted that the rule applies "Where there is doubtful language in 
a contract." J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 616 (2006). The PEA 
contends that the doubtful language is the term "pursue professional 
development". Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 12 - 13. The PEA spends significant 
amounts of time discussing how when Mr. Richards was defending his Master's 
Degree final project, he was pursuing "professional development". Appellants' 
Opening Brief, pp. 12 - 15. However, one particular comment in the PEA's brief 
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compels the School District to conclude that the true language at issue · is not 
"professional development". The PEA states "For al.I of these reasons, the 
Professional Leave provisions of the Master Agreement unambiguously required the 
School District to approve Richards' request to use a professional leave day .. " 
Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 13 - 14 (emphasis added). The issue then is not 
whether Mr. Richards' master's · degree project constitutes professional 
development, but whether there is any discretion. The PEA would have this Court 
conclude (as it attempted to do with the District Court), that when professional 
leave is requested, it must be granted. As noted by the PEA very early in these 
proceedings, 
While leave approvals must come from the principal concerning 
teacher absences, nowhere in the language of the Master Agreement 
concerning professional leave does it suggest that the administration 
(principal, superintendent or board) has the sole right to determine 
what professional development is. The professional himself/herself 
clearly should be left to make that determination within reason of the 
teaching profession [sic] and the limitation of two days [sic] if they 
have not already been afforded professional development 
opportunities. 
R. Vol. I, p. 111. Thus, the troublesome language is not "professional 
development", but is "if such absence is approved by the Principal." R. Vol. I, p. 
185 (Master Agreement § 10.5). Oddly, though both the School District and the 
PEA both suggested a version of this language, the actual language contained in 
the Professional Leave provision is the language proposed by the PEA. Compare R. 
Vol. I, p. 87 with R. Vol. II, pp. 185 - 86. Thus, if the PEA is so adamant that the 
rule of contra preferentem be applied, then in reality it should be applied against the 
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PEA. The facts show that if the PEA did not want any discretion on the part of the 
School District, they should not have suggested the language that gave the 
principal the discretion to determine whether professional leave will be allowed. 
They should have required that the Professional Leave provision contain the same 
mandatory language as ever'y other leave provision in the Master Agreement. Or in 
the alternative, the PEA should have demanded the inclusion of language that 
spelled out the limits of the principal' s discretion, or give the discretion to the 
certificated personnel requesting professional leave. Because they did not, the 
Court will either dictate that the School District has unlimited discretion, or in the 
alternative (as described above), a reasonableness standard is implied into the 
Professional Leave clause. In either case, the School District should prevail. 
This case is not about what the PEA would like the Court to believe it is 
about. It is not about whether the School District improperly denied Mr. Richards' 
request to take a professional leave day. Quite the opposite, the PEA is realizing 
that the Professional Leave provision to which they agreed is not mandatory, which 
they clearly want it to be. Now they are trying to convince this Court that the 
Professional Leave clause is mandatory, and that the School District must 
automatically grant professional leave when requested. Further, the PEA would 
have this Court conclude that the employee and not the School District has the 
discretion to determine what is and what is not professional leave. However, the 
language on that point is extraordinarily clear, and is certainly not ambiguous. 
"Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other schools is permitted at full 
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pay if such absence is approved by the Principal." R, Vol. I, p. 185 (emphasis 
added). The language could not be any clearer. 
The PEA argues that Judge Stegner rewrote the Professional Leave 
provisions of the Master Agreement to the benefit · of the School District. 
Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 15. This, however, is exactly what the PEA was (and 
is) trying to do; they want the Professional Leave provision to be read as giving the 
employee the · discretion, making professional leave mandatory. This is 
inappropriate. Just as Judge Stegner read the language of the Professional Leave 
provision interpreted its straightforward language7, the School District requests that 
this Court similarly apply the straightforward language of the Professional Leave 
provision. If the rule of contra proferentem applies, it should be applied against the 
PEA, who provided the discretionary language. The School District reasonably 
acted within its discretion. As Judge Stegner noted, though one may not agree 
with the School District's determination, Tr. Vol. I, p. 35, II. 8 - 10, it is clearly not 
an unreasonable conclusion. 
D. If the "Professional Development" Language in the Professional Leave Clause 
is Ambiguous, the Interpretation of the District Court and the School District 
Should Not be Disturbed on Appeal. 
If this Court agrees with the PEA that the language at issue in the 
Professional Leave clause is the "professional development" language, then it 
would appear, at a minimum, that the language is ambiguous, because it is 
7 Admittedly, Judge Stegner implied a reasonableness standard into the discretion of the 
School District. However, as discussed above, there are a number of cases holding that this may be 
allowable. 
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reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations. See Melichar v. State Farm 
Fire and Cas. Co., 143 Idaho 716, 720 {2007) .. Both the School District and the 
PEA contend that this language is unambiguous. Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 14. 
However, clearly, both the School District and the. PEA have come to 
different conclusions regarding whether Mr. Richards' master's degree in 
educational administration falls within the ambit of "professional development". 
There is significant caselaw holding that the interpretation of an ambiguous 
contract should not be disturbed on appeal if there is substantial and competent 
evidence to support the interpretation. Similarly, this Court has held numerous 
times that the discretionary decisions of a school board should not be second 
guessed by the courts. Each of these issues is discussed below. 
1. Judge Stegner' s interpretation of the Professional Leave clause is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, and should not be 
overturned on appeal. 
"If a contract is found ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact." 
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L. C., 140 Idaho 354, 361 (2004). "The 
question of whether a contract is ambiguous is itself a question of law." Boe/ v. 
Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 13 (2002). As questions of law are reviewed 
de novo on appeal, see Mut. of Enumclaw v. Box, 127 Idaho 851, 852 (1995), this 
Court must determine whether the contract itself was ambiguous. If the contract is 
ambiguous, then Judge Stegner's findings regarding whether the term "professional 
development" includes Mr. Richards' master's degree in educational administration 
is a question of fact. Factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they are 
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supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence. See Circle C 
Ranch Co. v. Jayo, 104 Idaho 353, 355 (1983); Stout v. Westover, 106 Idaho 
533, 534 (1984); Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 
Idaho 286, 290 (Idaho · Ct. App. 1984) (the appellate · court is "constrained to 
uphold the district judge's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous."). 
Further, the summary judgment standard changes where there will be a nonjury 
trial: 
When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the judge 
is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a 
motion for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive 
at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted 
evidentiary facts. 
Loomis v. Hailey, 11 9 Idaho 434, 437 ( 1 991). See also Riverside Dev. Co. v. 
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,519 (1982); Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469, 470 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1985). As the PEA notes, the demand for a jury trial was 
withdrawn, and this issue was to be a bench trial. Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 2. 
Therefore, Judge Stegner was allowed to draw what he believed were to be the 
most reasonable inferences from the facts presented. 
As discussed above, the School District believes that there is substantial and 
competent evidence to support the interpretation that Mr. Richards' master's 
degree in educational administration does not qualify as "professional 
development". Specifically, there are the inherent limits in the language of the 
Professional Leave clause itself that give guidance to this interpretation. 
Professional leave is specifically intended to be used for certificated personnel to 
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attend "educational meetings" or to "visit[] other schools". R. Vol. II, p. 185. The 
Professional Leave clause also allows for professional leave "to attend a 
professional meeting, to visit schools, or otherwise pursue professional 
development." R. Vol. II,. p. 186. These limitations are d_irectly related to the 
performance of a teacher's current duties, as opposed to their future career. 
"Educational meetings," "visiting other schools," and "professional meetings" do 
not in any way relate to a music teacher's desire to become an administrator. A 
contract must be read as a whole. Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 
Idaho 731, 735 (2000). Therefore, it makes little sense for.the PEA to argue that 
three of the restrictions listed in the Professional Leave clause relate specifically to 
the teacher's current duties, and that the fourth limit ("professional development") 
is open ended, and can include anything related to possible future careers, whether 
in or out of the same field. The "professional development" limitation should be 
read with the same intention as the other limitations: namely, professional 
development means development related to the teacher's current duties. 
Judge Stegner clearly understood this. He indicated that were Mr. Richards' 
master's degree in "pedagogy, music pedagogy, music performance, anything that I 
would consider to be within the ambit of Mr. Richards' responsibilities, I don't think 
there would be any doubt that that would - that this decision would be different 
that it is today." Tr. Vol. I, p. 34, II. 3 - 7. As Judge Stegner had a significant 
amount of involvement in the drafting of the Master Agreement, he certainly was in 
the best position to make this determination. Further, because this matter was 
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going to be a bench trial, Judge Stegner was allowed to look at the issues arid was 
free to arrive at the most probable inferences from the evidence. Given this 
freedom, Judge Stegner made a determination regarding how the "professional 
development" language should be interpreted. 
If this Court concludes that there was an ambiguity in the Professional Leave 
clause, it should not reverse Judge Stegner's decision. There is competent and 
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Mr. Richards' master's degree 
does not constitute professional development, and therefore professional leave was 
not available. 
2. Because the School District's decision was discretionary, it should not 
be disturbed on appeal. 
As discussed above, the Professional Leave clause gives the School District 
the discretion to determine whether to grant professional leave to certificated 
employees. The record shows that the School District's interpretation, throughout 
the grievance process to the present, has been that Mr. Richards' master's degree 
in educational administration does not qualify as professional development. See R. 
Vol. I, pp. 73, 108, 110, and 112 - 13. This decision was an exercise of discretion 
by the School District. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated numerous times that discretionary 
decisions by a school board should not be overturned by the courts absent arbitrary 
or capricious conduct. See Robinson v. Joint Sch. Dist., 100 Idaho 263, 265 
(1979) (citing language that the discretionary conduct of a school board should not 
be reviewed absent allegations of arbitrary or capricious conduct); Kolp v. Board of 
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Trustees, 102 Idaho 320, 322 -'- 23 (1981) (holding that in mandamus actions 
relating to teacher terminations, "If discretionary, mandamus will not lie unless it 
clearly appears that the board has acted arbitrarily, unjustly and in abuse of 
discretion 'and there is not available 0th.er plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law"); Bowler v. Board of Trustees, 101 Idaho 537, 540 (1980) 
(stating that the Court was not aware of any statute "providing for judicial 
appellate review from decisions of the board of trustees of a school district"); 
Rogers v. Gooding Pub. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 231 {in Re Rogers), 135 Idaho 480, 
483 (2001) (discipline of students is a discretionary issue, into which courts should 
only reluctantly involve themselves}. This is a logical conclusion. School boards are 
in a unique situation: they must defend their students from injury from without and 
within, 8 they must defend and support their teachers9 , and at the same time, they 
are frequently sued by both. In dealing with these conflicting interests (and many, 
many others), school boards have relatively little statutory guidance regarding how 
to proceed, and frequently are without adequate funding to meet their obligations. 
Thus, school districts are left to their own devices to determine how to move 
forward without being sued. 
This puts school boards and school districts in a situation where they are 
uniquely qualified to determine how they will proceed, because the best answer is 
not always immediately clear. However, in discretionary situations, school districts 
8 
9 
See, e.g., Idaho Code § 33-512(4). 
See, e.g., Idaho Code § 6-903(bl, 
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are not required to come up with the best answer, but are only required to come up 
with a reasonable answer. That is what occurred in this. case .. The School District 
determined that the Professional Leave clause gives the School District discretion 
to determlne when to grant professional leave. The Scho.ol District employees 
determined that Mr. Richards' should take personal leave to defend his master's 
degree, and the Board agreed. This may or may not be the absolute best decision, 
but it is certainly a reasonable one. Therefore, in such a discretionary situation, it 
would be improper for this Court to overturn the School District's decision absent 
evidence of arbitrary or capricious conduct. As the United States Supreme Court 
has stated, 
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of 
the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint .... By and 
large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of 
state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school 
systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic 
constitutional values. 
Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). As the PEA hasn't put forward 
evidence of arbitrary or capricious conduct, the School District requests that this 
Court affirm the District Court's decision. 
E. The School District is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal Because the PEA's 
Argument is Unreasonable. 
There are two statutes under which attorney fees may be awarded. /.C. § 
12-121 states "In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees 
to the prevailing party or parties." I. C. § 1 2-11 7 states 
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Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil 
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, 
a county or other taxing district and a person, th.e court shall award 
the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and 
reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom 
the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law: 
This Court has applied both of these statutes to cases involving governmental 
entities. See Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Boundary County, 138 Idaho 534, 537 
(2003). 
With regard to /. C. § 1 2-1 21, an award under this statute is appropriate "if 
the appellate court finds that the appeal was brought or pursued unreasonably or 
without foundation." Wolske Bros. v. Hudspeth Sawmill Co., 11 6 Idaho 714, 71 6 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1989). Such an award can be made if "the appellant has made no 
substantial showing that the lower court misapplied the law." Id. Where a party 
makes an argument that at first reads reasonably, but then on later inspection is 
discovered to be based on unreasonable grounds, an award of attorney fees against 
that party is appropriate. See O'Boskey v. First Fed. Sav. & loan Ass'n, 112 Idaho 
1 002, 101 0 ( 1987). With regard to /. C. § 12-11 7, the statute clearly spells out 
that attorney fees may be awarded if "the party against whom the judgment is 
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." See also Daw v. Sch. 
Dist. 91 Bd. of Trs., 136 Idaho 806, 808 (2001) (holding that an unreasonable 
statutory interpretation was grounds for awarding attorney fees). 
In this case, the PEA's argument (based on the rule of contra proferentem) 
seems logical, but on further inspection, it is clear that the rule is inapplicable. In 
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bringing this appeal, the PEA makes the same argument that it made in front of 
Judge Stegner, namely that the language at issue was unilaterally provided by the 
School District. Compare Appellants Opening Brief, pp. 11 - 15, with R. Vol. /, pp. 
59 - 62. This is clearly not the .case.· Both parties negotiate.ct the language of the 
Professional Leave provision. There is no evidence that Judge Stegner misapplied 
the law. Therefore, the PEA's argument is unreasonable, and the School District 
requests that attorney fees be granted on appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The PEA and the School District negotiated for a long period of time to work 
out the language of the Master Agreement. It is not unreasonable to assume that 
neither party was completely satisfied with the language. However, both parties 
agreed to it, including the language of the Professional Leave clause. Unlike every 
other type of leave in the Master Agreement, the Professional Leave clause clearly 
gives the School District discretion whether to grant professional leave. With regard 
to Mr. Richards' request to take profession leave to defend his master's degree in 
educational administration, the School District determined that this was outside the 
scope of his employment duties, and therefore was more appropriately categorized 
as a personal day. The PEA now seeks to rewrite the Professional Leave clause to 
take away the discretion from the School District, and make professional leave just 
as mandatory as every other type of leave. The District Court recognized that the 
School District had discretion, and further recognized that the School District's 
decision was reasonable. There is no evidence to contradict this conclusion. 
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Therefore, summary judgment was appropriately granted to the School District. The 
School District requests that this Court will so find. . . v/--
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this t- day of February, 2009. 
ANDERSON, JUL.IAN ll\ HULL LLP 
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